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Abstract
Global market concentration is the result of the interplay of differ-
ent sub-markets. According to this view, empirical analysis on the role
of concentration as an incentive or as a barrier to entry must be con-
ducted on a sub-market level, where the sub-markets are identified as
specific technological trajectories. In this paper we investigate the role
of 3-digit submarket concentration in the US pharmaceutical sector in
1987-1998. We take into account several sources of potential entry de-
terrence including the relative company size to the largest incumbent
firm and the number of competing products in each submarket. The
estimates of a panel logit model show that a concentrated industry at
submarket level seems to act like a barrier to entry. The relative com-
pany size is not significant while the number of competing products is
significantly positive.
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JEL codes L25, L65, C23, C25
∗We want to thank Massimo Bordignon, Farasat Bokhari, Paolo Bertoletti, Giovanni
Dosi, Paolo Garella, Francesco Guala, Rosella Levaggi, Franco Malerba, Franco Mariuzzo,
Claudio Piga, Fiona Scott Morton, Carl Shapiro, Geert Van Moer, Barbara Veronese,
Marco Vivarelli for helpful comments. Comments and suggestions from participants to
the CRESSE Conference 2017 “Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Reg-
ulation” (Heraklion, Crete, 30th June - 2nd July, 2017) and to the EARIE conference
in Maastricht (31 August – 2 September 2017) are gratefully acknowledged. The usual
disclaimers apply.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years the study of concentration is gaining a renewed interest since
a reduction of competition has been observed in the United States where
huge companies keep increasing their influence in the markets (Shapiro,
2017). A long-standing literature is devoted to global concentration and one
of the most discussed aspects is whether should be defined it as an incentive
or a barrier, to entry1. This paper participates in the debate analyzing
the companies behavior in terms of entry and greenfield (i.e. when the
company was not previously present in that sub-market) entry at sub-market
level using a detailed pharmaceutical dataset at 3-digit classification level.
Sutton’s (1998) seminal contribution shows that global concentration is the
result of the interplay of different sub-markets. Then, according to this view,
the analysis of such problems must be conducted on a sub-market basis,
where the sub-markets, or group of products, can be seen as technological
trajectories originating from a specific R&D line (see also Dosi, 19822).
The main idea is that companies with high investments in R&D are active
in many sub-markets, in order to diversify their offering. Their decisions are
very often interconnected across sub-markets; as a consequence, sub-market
concentration exerts an important impact on entry decision since companies’
evaluation in order to launch new products will necessarily be related to
it. As it was debated in the literature, the analysis3 performed until now
has considered only global market concentration without disentangling the
linkages and interplay among sub-markets. As a matter of fact, submarkets-
based investigation requires dataset able to hightlight technical trajectories
that are in general challenging to identify. Few exceptions refer to studies
performed within the chemical and the pharmaceutical sectors where the
identification of different technological trajectories is easier.
The pharmaceutical one is a typical example of a sector with many coex-
isting lines of R&D tecnological trajectories or submarkets (Sutton, 1998).
These coexisting R&D investments allow to gain additional market shares
inside each specific submarket. However, the links among submarkets are
weak; therefore it is harder to gain additional market shares in related sub-
markets. As a consequence the global market concentration doesn’t increase
too much. In the same work, Sutton (1998) identifies a different group of
sectors, characterized by an escalation process of some line of R&D to the
detriment of the others, thus implying higher global concentration for these
1The paper of Ghemawat and Ghadar (2006) deserves interest as regards the renewed
attention to global concentration. The paper shows that global integration doesn’t neces-
sarily mean higher global concentration.
2Dosi(1982) has introduced “technological paradigms”, trajectories originated from a
research program. Sutton (1998) takes into account Dosi’s contribution in his definition
of submarkets.
3As regards this point it would be useful look at the survey in Nishitateno (2015).
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sectors4.
We learn from previous theoretical work that there may be various
sources of entry deterrence. Under the hypothesis that entry deterrence
originates from limit-pricing strategy, the determinants of market entry
have been widely studied since the works of Bain (1954) and Sylos-Labini
(1962). Key contributions to the development of this literature include
Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) who focuses on capacity as deterrence, and
Schmalensee (1981) who investigates products proliferation as a barrier to
entry. A more recent contribution by Aghion and Bolton (1987) shows that
companies rely on long-term contracts to increase barriers to entry. How-
ever there is not a large amount of empirical evidence on entry deterrence
in Industrial Organization (IO), with the exception of Ellison and Ellison
(2011).
Closer to the spirit of our work, Breshanan and Reiss (1987, 1991) in-
vestigate the impact of both market size and degree of competition on entry
decisions. In particular they study how the number of producers in an
oligopolistic market varies with changes in demand and market competition
conditions. Their empirical results suggest that competitive behavioural
changes as quickly as the number of incumbents increases. Berry (1992)
shows that aircraft manufacturing companies are more likely to enter mar-
kets similar to those where they are active already. Mazzeo (2002) similarly
establishes these findings in motel markets.
Not many studies discuss the role of sub-market concentration in entry
determinants. Among these are Amisano and Giorgetti (2008) and Gior-
getti (2012), where this kind of analysis is developed with a broad level of
disaggregation.
The present research aims at understanding whether the concentration
may or may not have a barrier effect, in a market characterized by interplay
of different sub-markets, that is, if the concentration can affect the decision
of launching a new product at the company level in a given sub-market. To
this end, we focus on the effect of sub-market concentration in the probabil-
ity of a new product launch at firm-level using a detailed US pharmaceutical
market dataset of annual sales for the period 1987-1998. The products are
classified according to ATC classification with a breakdown at 3-digit. This
great sub-market detail makes it possibile to reproduce the analysis at the
same level adopted by the antitrust authorities. Moreover, the sub-market
dimension allows to exploit this information in detail and capture companies’
4Sutton (1998) identifies two groups of sectors: low alpha sectors and high alpha sectors.
The first group are sectors with low interactions among different submarkets both on the
demand and on the supply side. The second group includes sectors with strong linkages
among submarkets. In this case there is an escalation process of a submarket to the
detriment of others. A typical example of high-alpha sector, where there are strong linkages
among submarkets, is the aircraft sector (Sutton 1998). The advent of jet engines caused
the end of the turbo-prop engines, a technological trajectory undermined another one.
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heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we discuss the motivation
of the study; in section 3 the dataset is presented; the model and the results
are discussed in sections 4 and 5; final remarks are in section 6.
2 Motivation
Companies may assume several conducts to alter the spontaneous competi-
tive game in the markets, for example: strategic investments to deter entry
or product proliferation. The literature is mostly theoretical with reference
to strategic investments. One of the the few papers that exploit an empirical
approach is the above mentioned work by Ellison and Ellison (2011)5.
There is, not much empirical literature about the issue of product pro-
liferation as an instrument for strategic entry deterrence. In the pharma-
ceutical sector many prescription drugs are sold in a large number of “pre-
sentations”: e.g. the tranquilizer Haldol is sold in 1/2 , 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20
milligram tablets, as a concentrated liquid in bottles, and as a solution for
intravenous use in vials, ampules, and disposable syringes. When a drug is
produced in many presentations, it would be more expensive for an entrant
to replicate the incumbent’s full product line. A potential entrant can (and
often does) choose to produce a little subset of presentations offered by the
incumbent, thus reducing subsequent profits for potential entrants (Ellison
and Ellison, 2011). However, there is an effective alternative: try to offer a
larger portfolio in order to do business stealing.
Among the large number of papers in the IO literature on the topic of
entry in pharmaceutical markets, the above mentioned Ellison and Ellison
(2011), the studies by Kyle (2006) and the paper by Scott Morton (1999) de-
serve a special interest. Dealing with research questions similar to our own,
these studies take into account the role of incumbents as potential deter-
rence to entry, the number of competing products as a measure of potential
product proliferation. Nevertheless, they don’t take into consideration the
role of sub-market concentration.
Among the few studies on the role of sub-market concentration, we con-
sider in particular Amisano and Giorgetti (2013a, 2013b). In these papers
the submarket characteristics (market size, sunk costs, degree of compe-
tition) are exploited to assess company diversification and the choice of
markets to enter, while the role of sub-market concentration is ignored.
Inspired by these papers, in our study we investigate the role of pro-
deterrence variables (the relative size of the biggest incumbent to each com-
pany and the number of competing products) jointly with the role of sub-
5An interesting paper that analyzes the investment response of incumbents to new
entry in 39 chemical product industries refers to post entry investments to deter entry
(Liebermann, 1987).
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market concentration.
3 Data
The detailed dataset, obtained in the framework of the EPRIS Project,
University of Siena 6, refers the annual sales7 of 57 international companies
in USA for the period 1987-1998, and it is the same used by Bottazzi et
al. (2001), Bottazzi and Secchi (2005) and Amisano and Giorgetti (2008,
2013a, 2013b).
The original dataset includes information for 15732 units since all phar-
maceutical products are considered separately by “presentation” (tablets,
ampules, etc) and quantity of the active ingredient (eg 250mg, 500 mg, etc.).
The pharmaceutical products are classified according to the ATC classifica-
tion, based on the EphMRA (European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research
Association) Anatomical Classification. The classification breakdown iden-
tifies the sub-markets: the 1-digit level, described in Table 1, includes 16
sub-markets according to the Principal Anatomical Group. Each of these 16
sub-markets can be further organized in 2, 3, 4 and 5-digit segmentations. In
this paper we focus on the third level of segmentation in order to account for
the level of real world competition, according to antitrust authorities. The 3-
digit level identifies all the therapeutic pharmacological subgroup; for exam-
ple the N05B sub-market identifies all the anxiolytic drugs according to the
ATC, Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (for more informations on the
coding principles see http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js4876e/6.2.html).
Then, all the sales collected in the dataset are classified in 267 3-digit
sub-markets. Table 2 shows the 1-digit composition, that is how many 3-
digit classes are in each 1-digit class.
According to the usual practice, we eliminate all the observations be-
longing to 1-digit sub-markets B, K, T and V8. In addition, after a prelim-
inary screening of missing values and unreliable records, our final dataset
refers to 56 company and 205 3-digit sub-markets. Since we are interested
in company decisions of launching new products at sub-market level, we
consider the product observations aggregated at the company level in each
sub-market summing for each year the sales for each drugcode. In this way,
we are able to study the main effect of sub-markets concentration on the
entry decision in a given sub-market with new products, without differen-
tiating if the entry happens with one or more products. Then, the Entry
event covers both the greenfield entry and the choice to expand the range
6The data have been collected by IMS Health, which is the world’s leading provider of
information solutions to the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries.
7Sales figures are not transformed here in real terms since we consider just market
share in the following.
8This is done because of the potential unreliability in the data collection in these classes.
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Table 1: ATC classification, 1-digit level
A ‘Alimentary Tract and metabolism’ products
B ‘Blood and Blood Forming Organs’
C ‘Cardiovascular system products
D ‘Dermatological’ products
G ‘Genito-Urinary System and Sex Hormones’ products
H ‘Systemic hormonal preparations(excluding sex hormones)’ products
J ‘General Anti-Infective-Systemic’ products
K ‘Hospital Solutions’
L ‘Antineoplastic and Immunomodulating agents’ products
M ‘Musculo-Skeletal System’ products
N ‘Central Nervous System’ products
P ‘Parasitology’ products
R ‘Respiratory System’ products
S ‘Sensory Organs’ products
T ‘Diagnostic Agents’
V ‘Various’
Table 2: 3-digit breakdown for 1-digit class
1-digit A C D G H J L M N P R S Total
Freq. 37 25 14 20 10 23 10 9 16 4 19 17 204
Percent 18.1 12.3 6.9 9.8 4.9 11.3 4.9 4.4 7.8 1.9 9.3 8.3 100
Table 3: Number of any-entry by year
year 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Total
any-entry 135 136 102 107 120 132 111 116 139 146 87 1331
Table 4: Number of any-entry by 1-digit submarket
1-digit A C D G H J L M N P R S Total
any-entry 198 193 96 76 17 129 64 93 217 9 185 54 1331
Table 5: 1-digit submarket market share descriptive statistics over years
1-digit A C D G H J L M N P R S
mean 16.41 21.30 3.99 6.09 1.30 14.10 3.70 4.33 16.85 0.18 9.91 1.84
stdev 0.59 0.96 0.51 0.12 0.17 0.54 0.77 0.82 2.24 0.04 0.66 0.37
min 15.33 20.23 3.12 5.93 1.12 13.22 2.53 3.25 14.34 0.13 8.81 1.26
max 17.35 22.87 4.68 6.40 1.67 15.01 4.56 5.49 20.70 0.25 10.87 2.47
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of products being offered. We can name this definition of entry as “any-
entry”. Then when a new product enters the sub-market, the sales may go
from zero to a positive value. As a result, in our case, the units of analysis
are “companies per sub-markets”, which means that we consider the sales
of company i in sub-market j at time t. Since not all the companies are in
all the sub-markets, our dataset includes 1703 observations.
A further description of the dataset characteristics can be found in the
following tables. Table 3 describes the distribution of entries during the
period of our study, while Table 4 shows the number of the entries by 1-
digit sub-market. Table 5 shows the main descriptive statistics over the years
of the market share for the 1-digit class. Classes (A), (B) and (N) collect in
mean almost the 55% of the global market in the sample period. Class (N)
shows the greater variability of the yearly market shares. The Entry values
are more or less equally distributed across the time period considered, while
a higher number of entries occurs in the 3-digit sector of pharmaceutical
products related to diseases of the alimentary tract and metabolism organs
(A), the cardiovascular apparatus (C), the nervous and respiratory systems
(N) and (R) respectively. It is well known that pharmaceutical companies
address their decisions of launching products to markets characterized by
frequent and not rare diseases.
Tables 6 shows the distribution of the companies by the number of prod-
ucts launched. We can observe a lot of variety concerning different compa-
nies; in particular 15 firms made more than 30 launchs of products. The
modal value of any-entry concerns 17 international companies that carry
out launches of products in a number between 11 and 20. Table 7 describes
the distribution of the entries by submarket: the companies act in a hetero-
geneous way: for 26 submarkets there are any-entry values equal to zero,
the number of submarkets interested by a small number of entries (less than
6) are 102, and just in 2 submarkets we observe more than 50 entries. The
submarkets with more than 50 entries of new products are sub-market M1A
(Anti-inflammatory and Anti-rheumatic Products, Non-Steroids) with 62
entries and sub-market N2B (Other Analgesics and Antipyretics) with 51
entries respectively. These tables show the impact of additional informa-
tion that we can extract by focusing on narrower sub-market segmentation.
Figure 1 describes by boxplot the variability of of the Herfindhal index by
1-digit. In general, the median of the Herfindhal index takes values between
0.3 and 0.6 between the classes. All the distributions show a certain asym-
metry and the outliers for 1-digit class are mostly in the first two classes.
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Table 6: Firms by number of any-entry
Any-entry num. of firms
≤ 5 8
6-10 8
11-20 17
21-30 8
31-50 8
> 50 7
Total 56
Table 7: Sub-markets entered by number of any-entry
num. any-entry num. submarkets
0 26
1-5 102
6 -10 32
11- 20 33
21 -30 7
31 -50 3
>50 2
Total 205
Figure 1: Variability of Sub-market Herfindhal index by 1-digit level
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4 The Model
Concentration may or may not exert a barrier effect, and the decision of
launching a new product, at the company level, in a given sub-market is one
of the possible measures of this effect. In particular, we focus our attention
on the effect of sub-market concentration on the probability of new products’
launch at firm-level. To this aim, we define the event Entry as the launch
in the sub-market of one or more products that can be a real greenfield
(i.e. when the company was not previously present in that sub-market), or
an expansion of the range of products being offered. This Entry event is
identified when the sales for a specific drugcode become greater than zero.
In this way, we do not consider the number of new products launched by a
company but just the entry decision into a given sub-market j by company
i at time t. Then, the Entry decisions at firm level are represented by
a dummy variable yij,t that takes value 1 if the firm i decides to launch
new products into a given sub-market j a time t, and zero otherwise. It is
important to keep in mind we are not able to discriminate if the product
launched is a me-too drug or a new chemical entity. In our panel we count
1331 entries. Among these, we have only 83 New Chemical Entities (NCE),
with a percentage of 6.2% and more than the 50% of NCE entries take place
in the last three years of our observation period. Moreover, we collapsed the
information down to obtain a panel at “company-submarket” level losing
the information at product level, so a specific analysis for NCE is scarcely
exploitable in an immediate and clear way.
To analyze the effect of sub-market concentration on the firm entry de-
cision, we adopt the panel-logit model defined as follows:
Pr(yij,t = 1) = Λ(β0 + β1x1ij,t−1 + . . . βkxkij,t−1 + ci) (1)
where i refers to company, j to sub-market, t to time, Λ(z) = e
z
1+ez , and ci
represents the unobserved heterogeneity. It is well known that a method to
incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in a logit or probit model is to include
a set of subject-specific parameters ci (see, among others: Wooldridge 2005,
2010, 2011; Halaby 2004) that may be treated as fixed or random. The panel
includes 1703 units; it is recognized that, in such a situation, Fixed Effect
could lead to the incidental parameters problem. Moreover, as pointed out
by Wooldridge (2010, pag. 286) if the key explanatory variables do not vary
much over time, Fixed Effect estimator can lead to imprecise estimate, that
is it have a greater variance. These considerations and the nature of the
available data suggest a Random Effect Logit model. Maximum Likelihood
estimates are obtained by the adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature, using
STATA14. The assumption of normal distribution for ci allows us to evaluate
the population average effect (APE) (Wooldridge 2010).
All the explanatory variables in the model are considered lagged of order
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1 to take into account that the decision of launching a product is determined
both by firm and sub-market characteristics that preempt this decision. Fur-
thermore, it is well known that the launch of new pharmaceutical products
is a long process that has to overtake many decisions internal to the com-
pany and many authorization phases. The choice of one lag period is thus
due to the necessity of not losing too much information and in oder to
shorten the panel length. Among the regressors we consider variables that
are not commonly used in this framework, in particular: the number of
products offered by each company in each specific sub-market, the number
of competing products in the same sub-market, the number of sub-markets
entered by each company and the relative size of each company compared
to the biggest incumbent in each sub-market, and a measure of individual
market specification.
The behavior of general demand for pharmaceutical goods is taken into
account by considering the growth rate of the per-capita real total prescrip-
tion drug expenditures in US in the observed period. The total prescrip-
tion drug expenditures come from National Health Expenditure Accounts
(NHEA)9 expressed in nominal terms and not adjusted to remove the impact
of changes in health care prices. Although a price index for Personal Health
Care goods and services is available, there is not a corresponding price index
for the aggregate NHE, so the data are transformed in real terms by using
the US CPI. The differences in the annual growth rates of the NHE reflect
trends in the factors that affect health care spending, including technologi-
cal developments, changes in the age and sex composition of the population
(demographic effects), changes in the use of health care goods and services
and changes in prices for health care goods and services. In more detail, the
variables employed in our model are:
1. SMSij,t−1 , the sub-market market share, namely the lagged (at t-1)
value of the market share of each company in each sub-market.
2. MSi,t−1, the general market share, namely the lagged (at t-1) market
share of each company in the whole pharmaceutical sector (all the
sub-markets).
3. Natc3i,t−1, the lagged number of sub-markets in which each company
is present. This is a measure of the diversification already achieved.
4. IHj,t−1, the lagged Herfindhal index, the concentration level in each
sub-market.
5. NISj,t−1, the lagged number of competing incumbent companies in
each sub-market, a measure of competition.
9Data are available at: https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealth
ExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html
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6. NFCj,t−1, the lagged number of products offered by competing in-
cumbents in each specific sub-market.
7. DISrelij,t−1, the relative size of each company compared to the biggest
incumbent in each sub-market.
8. PCEXt−1 the growth rate of the per-capita real total prescription
drug expenditures in US in the considered period. Since this variable
is constant across units it can also play the role of time dummies.
9. PIij,t−1, the lagged number of products offered by each company in
each specific sub-market.
10. Diveri,t−1, a technological diversification indicator, the lagged number
of 2-digit submarkets entered by firm i at time t-1.
The variable Diveri,t−1 increases (or descreases) its value only if the en-
try (or exit) happens in a 3-digit submarket that belongs to a new 2-digit
submarket for the firm. In this way, we capture the technological diversifi-
cation decisions and we can disentangle an expansion through new lines of
business (a new 2-digit submarket) from an expansion due to the increase of
the range of products being offered in the same 2-digit submarket (the same
line of business). This measure implies a definition of diversification that is
different from that implied by simply considering greenfields. A new prod-
uct can be launched into a subsector belonging to the same 2-digit group
in which the company is already present. The effort required for such di-
versification would be less expensive compared to the launches of products
in new lines of business, that is launches in 2-digit submarkets where the
company has no product. This indicator should capture some technological
diversification.
This index is different from the Natc3i,t−1, which doesn’t allow to take
into account the technological diversification.
Time dummies are not explicitly considered, since, as mentioned before,
the growth rate of the per-capita real total prescription drug expenditures
PCEX is constant across units then it also play the role of time dummies.
Table 8 collects descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.
Exploiting the contribution by Wooldridge (2005) for the unobserved
heterogeneity and following Amisano and Giorgetti (2013) the potential en-
dogenous variables enter the model with their initial conditions. The covari-
ates are divided into 3 groups: x(1i) includes the strictly exogenous regres-
sors, x(2i) includes the regressors that are not strictly exogenous (of course
among them we have the lagged dependent variable) and x(3) the regressors
which do not vary across units, such as for example the intercept term, the
growth rate of of the per-capita real total prescription drug expenditures.
The distribution of the random effects ci is conditioned on all the average
11
Table 8: Explanatory variables descriptive statistics
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MS .06 .20 0 3.91
SMS .11 .23 0 1
PI 1.56 1.73 0 15
IH .40 .23 0 1
NIS 11.11 6.66 0 29
NFC 21.61 19.73 0 98
DISrel .71 .40 0 1
Natc3 39.80 23.40 0 91
PCEX 6.74 3.37 1.3 11.03
Diver 24.93 12.31 0 53
sample10 values of the regressors in x(1i) as well as on the initial values of
x(2i).
The resulting specification is:
ci = γ
′
1
−
x(1i) + γ
′
2x(2i) + αi (2)
−
x1i =
1
T
T∑
t=1
x(1it) (3)
In particular, as in Wooldridge (2005), we assume that
(ci|X(1i),x(2i0),θ) v N
(
f(X(1i),x(1i0),θ), σc
)
(4)
and we use a linear specification for the conditional expectation.
In our case we have no exogenous variable with the exception of the per-
capita expenditure growth rate. The endogenous variables considered with
their initial conditions are the sub-market share, the global market share,
the entry, the number of own products in each sub-market, the number of
products by competitors in each sub-market, the number of sub-markets
entered, the relative size of each company compared to incumbent, the di-
versification measure, all calculated at the initial year of observation (1988)
x(2i) = [MSi0, SMSi0, P Ii0, NFCi0, Natc3i0, DISreli0, Diveri0].
Since in our dataset the number of the events Entry is just 7.3% of
the total observations, our data could be affected by rarity of events, i.e.
the number of the any-entry may be small compared to the total number
of observations. King and Zeng (2001, pag. 693) classify the rare events
as “binary dependent variables characterized as by dozens to thousands of
times fewer ones than zeroes (nonevents)”.
10To reduce the number of regressors, the value of exogenous regressors enter with the
mean value, with an approach due to Mundlak (1978) and further used in Heckman (1981).
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In particular, the main problem when a great number of units in a panel
have no events (i.e. a great number of units that never show y = 1) is that
logit coefficients are biased in small samples (less then 200). Of course, the
simplest way of correcting the problem is by decreasing the rarity of the
event, increasing the efficiency of subsequent data collections changing the
optimal trade-off between gathering more observations and including better
or additional variables, as suggested by King and Zeng (2001). They also
suggest a “Prior correction”, that is a correction of the logistic estimated
using a factor based on prior information about the fraction of events (the
“ones”) in the population. Unfortunately, both of these strategies are not
applicable in our case. Notice that our dataset has 1703 observations, so at
least it is not small.
5 Results
Table 9 presents the results for two different model specifications: in the
specification labeled (Mod1 ) we consider all the variables mentioned before,
while (Mod2 ) is a restricted specification. All the variables, with the ex-
ception of relative size with respect to the biggest incumbent DISrelij,t−1
and technological diversification Diveri,t−1, are statistically significant. For
the remaining variables the estimated coefficients in the two specifications
are similar. The signs are in line with the expectations. More precisely, the
general market share (MSi,t−1) in all the US pharmaceutical sub-markets
increases the probability to launch a new product, so the largest companies
have higher chances to introduce products into specific 3-digit sub-market.
The (lagged) sub-market share (SMSi,j,t−1) is significant with a negative
sign, as the lagged number of products (PIi,j,t−1) introduced by each com-
pany.
These results are in line with the previous literature: the company’s
size,(MSij,t−1), measured, in this case, as the global market share, induces
companies to launch new products, that is, larger firms have a well-known
tendency towards a continuos growth. On the contrary, the market share
into a specific sub-market (SMSij,t−1) reduces the probability to launch
additional products, that is, companies are interested in reaching a certain
“optimal presence in the sub market”. In case this sub-market share has
been reached, companies seem to reduce the new products launches.
The initial number of products (PIi0) in each sub-market is significant
and positive while the lagged number of products launched is negatively sig-
nificant. Again, it seems that companies are interested in entering a certain
number of sub-markets, and, when a certain presence has been reached, the
probability to launch a new product is decreasing.
The Herfindhal index (IHj,t−1) is a barrier to the launch of ”new” products;
this result confirms the findings in previous studies (Amisano and Giorgetti,
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2008, Giorgetti 2012) with a lower level of disaggregation, the 1-digit ATC
classification. In the present case, by taking into consideration a deeper level
of segmentation, the Herfindhal index has a significant and negative impact
on the decision of launching new products. The idea that the possibility to
exploit sub-market power could encourage the introduction of products is
completely misleading. According to our results, entry is inversely correlated
with the level of concentration: higher concentration, and consequently less
competition, implies less entry. Our results can also offer some contribution
to the old debate, in the literature, on the relationship between entry and
competition (Breshnan and Reiss, 1991).
The number of incumbent companies (NISj,t−1) is a disincentive to the
launch of new products, as suggested by the literature (Netz and Taylor,
2002): the number of companies is a standard proxy for the level of compe-
tition in all the entry-exit reduced form models: companies are discouraged
to launch their first product or to add a further product when there is a
strong competition.
The company’s presence in many sub-markets (Natc3j,t−1) is an in-
centive to launch a new product into a specific sub-market, this regressor
presents a considerable elasticity, more than 1. It can be argued that a
greater level of diversification pushes companies to launch more products.
While the lagged number of sub-markets entered Natc3i,t−1 is significant
and positive, the initial number (Natc3i0) is significant and negative. If
in the initial period a company has not entered a considerable number of
sub-markets, it will continue avoid to launch additional products. Otherwise
this tendency could be overturned during the period of observation and the
presence of a lagged diversification (Natc3i,t−1) will increase the probability
of launching additional products.
The relative size of the biggest incumbent compared to each potential
entrant DISrelij,t−1, that is our proxy for potential predation, is not sig-
nificant. In theory a bigger incumbent company could carry out predation
strategies more easily (Benoit, 198411, and Holmostrom and Tirole, 1997).
In a situation where a firm is financially stronger than another, the former
can use its deeper pockets (long purse) to force the latter out of the industry.
This lack of significance could be partially explained by a large heterogen-
ity among the 3-digit sub-markets studied. However it was not possible to
analyze separately each specific sub-market because of the small number of
entries in all the pharmaceutical sectors.
The estimated coefficient for the number of products (NFCi,j,t−1) offered
in the same sub-market by competitors suggests that this is an incentive to
launch another product. This result, at first sight, could be counterintuitive,
since pharmaceutical companies usually offer the same product in many pre-
11Benoit (1984) deals with a simple model of predation, Holmostrom and Tirole (1997)
deals with a model of predation in imperfect markets.
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Table 9: Logit Coefficient estimates
Mod1 Mod2
var estim. z-ratio estim. z-ratio
MSi,t−1 .778 (2.30) ∗∗ .688 (2.10) ∗∗∗
SMSij,t−1 -1.349 (-2.85) ∗∗∗ -1.214 (-2.96) ∗∗∗
PIij,t−1 -.316 (-4.59) ∗∗∗ -.302 (-4.53) ∗∗∗
IHj,t−1 -.799 (-2.96) ∗∗∗ -.772 (-3.38) ∗∗∗
NISj,t−1 -.030 (-2.18) ∗∗ -.034 (-2.72) ∗∗∗
NFCj,t−1 .049 (6.97) ∗∗∗ .048 (7.20) ∗∗∗
Natc3ij,t−1 .041 (5.80) ∗∗∗ .041 (5.95) ∗∗∗
DISrelij,t−1 -.015 (-0.12) – –
Diveri,t−1 -.0002 (-0.04) – –
PCEXt−1 .0213 (1.77) ∗ 0.018 1.58
MSi0 -.256 (-0.67) -.151 (-0.42)
SMSi0 .865 (1.60) .922 (2.30)
∗∗
PIi0 .437 (6.00)
∗∗∗ 0.438 (6.24) ∗∗∗
NFCi0 -.040 (-5.40)
∗∗∗ -.0397 (-5.58) ∗∗∗
Natc3i0 -.039 (-5.20)
∗∗∗ -.041 (-5.54) ∗∗∗
DISreli0 -.160 (-0.61) – –
Diveri0 0.006 (0.74) – –
const -2.868 (-10.43) ∗∗∗ -2.782 (-14.99) ∗∗∗
sentations: liquid, oral and etc. This could be an obstacle for a new entrant,
that can enter only with a subset of products. A large number of products
by competitors could be an obstacle but in the present application we find
the opposite. The high number of products offered by competitors increases
the probability to launch additional products. This can be explained by the
attempt of each company to offer comparable portfolios of products to other
incumbent companies and to do business stealing to the same competitors12.
The elasticity for this variable is close to 1 for both specifications.
The growth rate of per-capita real total prescription drug expenditures in
US (PCEXt−1) is positively significant at 10%.
The variable Diveri,t−1, aimed at measuring technological diversifica-
tion, is not significant. This is mainly due to the difficulty to enter com-
pletely different lines of business (different therapeutical groups, 2-digits
ATC classification). As a matter of fact diversification needs a long period
of time in research, authorization procedure and a large amount of money
with an uncertain profitability. This result anyway confirms the same evi-
dence obtained by Bottazzi and Secchi (2005) who do not identify a precise
diversification pattern in the pharmaceutical industry worldwide.
12We consider this variable as endogenous because companies decide their portfolio by
taking into account the portfolio choice of their competitors.
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Table 10: Logit APE and elasticity
Mod1 Mod2
var APE Elast APE Elast
MSi,t−1 .049 ∗∗ .038 ∗∗ 0.043 ∗∗ .034 ∗∗
SMSij,t−1 -.084 ∗∗∗ -.128 ∗∗∗ -.076 ∗∗∗ -.123 ∗∗∗
PIij,t−1 -.019 ∗∗∗ -.392 ∗∗∗ -.019 ∗∗∗ -.387 ∗∗∗
IHj,t−1 -.050 ∗∗∗ -.283 ∗∗∗ -.049 ∗∗∗ -.276 ∗∗∗
NISj,t−1 -.002 ∗∗∗ -.287 ∗∗ -.002 ∗∗∗ -.330 ∗∗∗
NFCj,t−1 .003 ∗∗∗ 0.913 ∗∗∗ 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.900 ∗∗∗
Natc3ij,t−1 .003 ∗∗∗ 1.370 ∗∗∗ 0.003 ∗∗∗ 1.386 ∗∗∗
DISreli0 -.9e-3 -0.009 – –
Diveri0 .2e-4 -0.006 – –
PCEXt−1 .001 ∗∗∗ .103 ∗ 0.001 0.876 ∗∗∗
The corresponding average partial effect and elasticity for all variables
are reported in table 10.
The main results can be summarized as follows. The number of sub-
markets entered, by each company, increases the probability to launch addi-
tional product. The sub-market concentration acts as barrier to entry, the
relative size of the biggest incumbent compared to each potential entrant is
not significant, the number of competing products induces the launch of an
additional product.
The role played by competing products is positively significant. This
counter-intuitive result, at first sight, can be explained by a business stealing
effect. Firms have to present to customers a comparable range of products.
The last important result concerns the number of sub-markets entered by
each company: companies that experienced, with one-year lag, a certain
propensity towards diversification, overcome with more facility the barrier
to entry of sub-market concentration.
Unfortunately, in our current analysis, we are not able to differentiate
among NCE and me-too-drugs; this could help us to further differentiate the
role of sub-market concentration in case of products protected by patents.
6 Conclusions
The paper investigates the role of sub-market concentration in entry decision
in the pharmaceutical sector in the USA by taking into account other several
potential entry deterrence variables. Following previous papers dedicated to
this topic, we analyse the companies’ decisions of launching products in US
pharmaceutical sub-markets in the period 1988-1998 adopting a deep level
of segmentation, identified according to the 3-digit breakdown of the ATC
classification.
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The contribution of this paper is twofold: to analyse sub-market con-
centration, a topic scarcely considered in the literature, with a good level of
disaggregation, and to propose a way for analysing other sectors with high
investments in R&D where the strength of linkages among submarkets play
a big role.
In this paper we focus our attention on a typical low-alpha sector, that
is a sector with weak linkages among sub-markets (Sutton, 1998). A study
on entry decisions, conducted in a similar way for a high-alpha sector could
help to investigate the presence or the absence of regularities as regards the
role of sub-market concentration in high R&D investments sectors.
In order to disentangle the “potential” role played by the concentration
from other potential deterrence variables, we introduced some specific re-
gressors as the number of competing products and the relative size of each
company compared to the biggest company in each sub-market.
Our findings suggest that, in analysing the sub-market entry determi-
nants, it is extremely important to take into account, not only submarket
concentration but also other rival company strategies as the diversification
of potential entrants and potential predation by incumbents.
In fact, the number of products by competitors in the same sub-market
increases the probability to launch new products in order to have comparable
products portfolio, while the relative size of companies compared to the
biggest incumbent, our proxy of potential deterrence is not significant.
Further analysis that verifies a role of sub-market concentration as bar-
rier to entry could be improved by differentiating entry with respect to “the
me-too-drugs” or NCE. If the company decides to launch a new chemical
entity, will concentration be again a barrier to entry? This will be the object
of ongoing studies.
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